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I. Introduction: The Man of Tomorrow
He is one of the most iconic fictional characters of all time. Since his
initial appearance in Action Comics, Vol. 1 in 1934,1 Superman has occupied a
storied and dynamic place in the popular culture that goes beyond his roots as
an expression of modern mythology. 2 His ability to leap tall buildings in a
single bound has amounted to nothing compared with his ability to leap
between media platforms. From comic books to newspaper strips, radio plays
to television series, and movies to licensed merchandise, the Superman
character has proven to be a highly adaptable and highly profitable parcel of
intellectual property.3 But over Superman's decades-long history, behind his

* J.D. Candidate, U.C. Hastings College of the Law, 2010. B.A. Political Science and English,
Florida State University, 2003. I would like to thank my family for their support and motivation,
especially my mother Joanne. I would also like to thank my girlfriend Sommer, who makes
everything I do possible.
1. Benjamin A. Goldberger, How the "Summer of the Spinoff' Came To Be: The Branding of
Charactersin American Mass Media, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 301, 341 (2003).
2. Dennis O'Neil, The Crimson Viper versus the ManiacalMorphing Meme, in SUPERHEROES AND
PHILOSOPHY: TRUTH, JUSTICE, AND THE SOCRATIC WAY 21, 24 (Tom Morris & Matt Morris eds.,
2005).
3. GERARD JONES, MEN OF TOMORROW: GEEKS, GANGSTERS, AND THE BIRTH OF THE
AMERICAN CoMIC BOOK 185, 332 (2004).
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four-color battles and alien invasions, the creators of Superman, Jerome Siegel
and Joseph Shuster, have endured a never-ending battle of their own to assert
their rights in the "Man of Steel" they created. 4 Over the years, this battle
especially affected Jerome Siegel. He lived a "lifetime of rage," embodying the
role of the alienated creator and suffering as the product of his imagination
belonged to the publisher. 5 The battle between the creators and the publisher
played out in courtrooms and across negotiation tables for decades and has
more colorful characters and dramatic moments than any comic book
adventure.
The latest round of litigation over ownership rights to Superman is in
progress and commentators predict a settlement on the horizon, though there
are many aspects of the matter that still require adjudication. 6 Interestingly,
the proceedings thus far have produced at least one significant and potentially
far-reaching outcome. In Siegel v. Warner Brothers Entertainment, Inc.,7 Siegel's
8
heirs utilized the "termination of transfer" provision of the Copyright Act
and obtained a summary judgment explicitly recognizing their copyright
interest in the character of Superman, 9 notwithstanding the fact that Siegel
signed his interest away several times since the character debuted in the
1930s.10
The Siegel decision implicitly addresses the moral right of an author to his
work, which is traditionally not a factor in American copyright law, and offers
an especially salient lens through which to view the justifications for these
rights." This philosophical conception of copyright, with its focus on the
relationship between a creator and his creation, has historically occupied an
uncomfortable place in American jurisprudence. 12 This discomfort is a result
of the utilitarian statutory language, which focuses more on promoting artistic
progress than on the ethical or philosophical connection between a creator
and his creation. 13 The Siegel decision demonstrates the benefits of valuing
moral rights in determining intellectual property ownership rights, at least
when dealing with characters sold before their value was realized. This

4. Id. at 185.
5. Id. at xiii.
6. Posting ofJeff Trexler to Newsarama, http://blog.newsarama.com/2009/01/15/superman
-rewritten/(aanuary 15, 2009, 03:06).
7. 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (2006).
9. Siegel, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1145.
10. Id. at 1107-14.
11. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38
VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (1985).

12.
(2001).
13.

Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rigbts in Copyrigbt, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 795, 814
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
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departure from previous copyright decisions is slight, but important, because
it highlights the vigorous debate over the scope of copyright law. 14 The right
of authors and their heirs to terminate licenses and recapture the copyright
interest is a powerful tool by which authors and their families can reassert
ownership rights in their creations, despite the fact that they had previously
assigned their rights to other parties.' 5 The result goes beyond the ability to
simply renegotiate licenses and allows the full reclamation of previously
relinquished intellectual property. As such, Siegel may herald at least a subtle
shift in the copyright regime toward the legal recognition of moral rights.
This Note examines the Siegel decision as an example of how an author's
moral rights to his or her creations can factor into American copyright law,
with particular focus on the larger struggle between the competing interests of
creators and purveyors of intangible media. In order to understand the
decision in these terms, Part II provides a brief historical background of moral
rights in American intellectual property law and contrasts the American
tradition with the European approach. Part II then focuses in on the specifics
of the Siegel decision and explores the origins of the never-ending battle
between the Siegels and the publisher who owns the rights to Superman.
Lastly, Part II outlines the competing interests in the Siegellitigation. Part III
analyzes how the Siegel decision operates as a vindication of moral rights by
delving into the controversies surrounding the termination of assignments by
the heirs of authors. Part IV examines why this case is a victory for the
conception of moral intellectual property rights, and why this approach is
better than a purely economic conception. Part V concludes with a summary
and some closing thoughts on the rhetorical value of Superman as a test case
for resolving these issues.

II. Background: The Never-Ending Battle
A.

Secret Origins: Siegel, Shuster, and DC Comics

In 1938, Jerome Siegel and Joseph Shuster were two socially awkward
science fiction fans. 16 Unaware that Siegel's words and Shuster's artwork
would become the template for the world's most famous superhero and
launch the entire comic book industry, the pair collaborated on a series of
illustrated short stories and comic strips. 17 Superman's first iteration was a
bald menace to humanity, initially conceived as the villain of an early prose

14.

See LAURENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF CREATIVITY 276

(2004).

15. Peter Afrasiabi, Superman'sLatest Episode: The Rights ofAuthors and Their Families to Terminate a
Copyright Grantand Recapture the Copyright,50 ORANGE COUNTY LAWYER 34,35 (2008).
16. JONES, supra note 3, at 35, 86.
17.

LES DANIELS, SUPERMAN: THE COMPLETE HISTORY 18-19 (1998).
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piece.' 8 The partners eventually reworked the eponymous character into the
more heroic version known to today's readers 19 and packaged a few stories to
sell in the burgeoning comic book marketplace.20 Siegel and Shuster
attempted to sell Superman as an ongoing comic strip to daily newspapers,
21
but the pair had a difficult time making a syndicate deal in this format.
Eventually they found a buyer in National Allied Publications ("National"),
but National was only interested in publishing Superman in a reworked comic
book form different from the typical newspaper-style strip. 22 Editor Vin
Sullivan commissioned the team to rework their substantially completed strips
into the new comic book format with cut-and-pasted strips and new material
to make longer stories. 23 Siegel and Shuster were excited at the prospect of
getting their story out into the marketplace and thrilled at the $130 they
received in exchange for assigning all rights to the character to the publisher.24
Siegel and Shuster were used to this kind of arrangement because it was the
same set of circumstances under which they had sold their previous
creations. 25 Unfortunately, their satisfaction with this standard arrangement
was short-lived.
When Siegel and Shuster initially signed their rights over to National, they
did so under the U.S. Copyright Act of 1909 which granted the holder of a
copyright protection for that work for twenty-eight years from the date of its
publication. 26 It is unclear what Siegel and Shuster intended to do at the end
of the initial twenty-eight-year term. When this term expired, Siegel and
Shuster could have renewed the copyright for a second twenty-eight year
period 27 and renegotiated with National with a clearer idea of what the
property was worth on the open market.2 8 They had great faith in the
enduring appeal of Superman, 29 as demonstrated in their persistence in
shopping the character around unsuccessfully for years before their success
with National, which then became Detective Comics ("DC").30 From the
start, Siegel deeply believed in the long-term possibility of the Superman

18. Id. at 82.
19. Id. at 115.
20. Id. at 124. See also DANIELS, supra note 17, at 37.
21. See DANIELS, supranote 17, at 25.
22. Id. at 23.
23. Id. at 30-31.
24. SeeJONES, supra note 3, at 125; Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entr't, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098,
1107 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
25. JONES, supra note 3, at 125.
26. Siegel, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1117.
27. See Afrasiabi, supra note 15, at 35.
28. Harry Fox Agency, Inc. v. Mills Music, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 844, 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
29. See Jones, supra note 3, at 115.
30. DANIELS, supra note 17, at 30.
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concept, referring to Superman in early sketches as "The Super Strip of Them
3
Al!" 1

The contemporary publishing industry operated on a consignment basis,
whereby companies like DC had no way of knowing, in a timely manner, the
precise sales figures of their periodicals. 32 The best they could hope for were
rough averages that were received months after the initial books hit the
stands. 33 It did not take long for the sales of Superman to break records and
swiftly begin to outsell the competition on the newsstands. 34 It also did not
take long for Siegel to start feeling that the publisher had taken advantage of
him, and he began writing frequent letters requesting greater compensation in
the form of higher pay rates for Shuster and him.35
This dissatisfaction came to a head in 1947, when Siegel and Shuster
brought an action in New York against DC 36 to rescind their earlier
assignment of all rights in the Superman character, claiming the agreement
was "void for lack of mutuality and consideration." 37 This litigation was the
first volley in what would prove to be an extended series of legal skirmishes,
setting the tone for the disappointment Siegel and Shuster would continue to
encounter in their litigation efforts. The trial judge refused to void the
assignment and held that DC was the exclusive owner of Superman and the
entirety of rights in the character. 38 The suit produced an eventual settlement
that garnered the creators an additional $94,000 each, in exchange for signing
a stipulation that DC was the sole owner of the character. 39 While this
amount was much higher than their initial payment, it was still a pittance
compared to the overall revenue the character would continue to generate.
However, that was not the end of the matter. In 1966, the initial
copyright term expired and the parties once more took to the courtroom in
order to trade punches over the ownership of Superman. 40 In the second
action, the Second Circuit ruled that, when Siegel and Shuster originally
assigned Superman's initial copyright term to DC, they also transferred their
interest in the renewal term, "even though those renewal rights had yet to vest

31. JONES, supra note 3, at 115.
32. Id. at 141.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 185-86.
36. DC eventually became a part of the Time Warner media empire, although the comic books
are still published under the DC banner and for the remainder of the Note will be referred to as DC.
Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
37. Id.atlll2.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Siegel v. Nat'l Periodical Publ'ns, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 1032, 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 508
F.2d 909 (2d Cit. 1974).
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when the grant (and later the stipulation) was made." 41 Siegel and Shuster
were unable to recapture their rights to Superman.
In the 1970s, DC was faced with an image problem. 42 Both Siegel and
Shuster had experienced prolonged financial difficulty, a sorry state of affairs
that stood in stark contrast to the success of the publisher. 43 To bolster
public opinion before the release of the Superman movie, DC entered into a
further agreement with Siegel and Shuster in 1975. 44 The terms of this
agreement were more favorable to the creators, as long as they "reacknowledged the Second Circuit's decision that 'all right, title and interest in'
Superman ('including any and all renewals and extensions of... such rights')
resided exclusively with DC Comics .... ,45
The Copyright Act of 1976 changed the legal landscape concerning
artists' transfers of the copyrights in their creations by giving "artists and their
heirs the ability to terminate any prior grants of the rights to their creations that
were executed before January 1, 1978, regardless of the terms contained in
such assignments .... ,,46 This grant gave writers like Siegel and artists like
47
Shuster (and their heirs) the ability to reassert their rights in their creations,
and provided Siegel a third chance to terminate the earlier assignment to DC.
However, the process for determining when a license or transfer can be
terminated under this scheme is complicated and relies on a number of arcane
and rigidly formalistic formulae. 48 The process of termination is convoluted
and the requirements are potentially confusing, but if creators can clear the
procedural hurdles, they can reassert ownership in their intellectual property
and regain relinquished copyrights. 49 This right of termination applies
"regardless of the terms contained in such assignments." 50 It is this right that
the Siegel family asserted in the present case and the bulk of the summary
judgment opinion is dedicated to exploring the minutiae of their claim in
51
order to assess its validity.

41. Siegel, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1112.
42. Jet Heer, The Injustice of Superman, THE GUARDIAN, April 5, 2008, available at http://
www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/apr/05/theinjusticeofsuperman.
43. Id.
44. Siegel, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1113.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Ashok Chandra, Note, Cris of Indefinite Consequence: How the Deivative Works Exception and the
Lanham Act Undercut the Remunerative Value of Termination of Transfers, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 241, 262 (2005).

48.
49.
Bender
50.
51.

Afrasiabi, supra note 15, at 34.
3 MELVILLE B. NIMER & DAVID NMIMVER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 11.07 (Matthew
& Co., Inc. 2009) (1978).
Siegel, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1113.
Id. at 1101,1116-39.
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B. Fortress of Solitude: Moral Rights in American Copyright
American copyright law has historically stemmed from "consequentialist,
economic, and incentive-based justifications, while continental European
copyright law is informed to a greater degree by natural rights and concern to
protect the personality interests of the author. '5 2 This difference betrays a
fundamentally divergent view of the nature of media, whether art is seen as
cultural production or merely creative goods.
While the moral rights approach is popular in most civil law jurisdictions,
France is the spiritual center of this approach to copyright protection.5 3 The
term "moral rights" comes from civil law and is a translation of the French le
droit moral.54 "[These] rights are of a spiritual, non-economic and personal
nature," 55 springing from a "belief that an artist in the process of creation
injects his spirit into the work and that the artist's personality, as well as the
integrity of the work, should therefore be protected and preserved." 56 These
rights are directly tied to the role that the creator plays by mixing his labor
with the raw creative essence of imagination and making something new. The
artist can then sell his new creative product on the open market with other
tradable commodities.5 7 Notwithstanding the commercial value of the work,
the creation is nevertheless personal to the artist, and these moral rights exist
independently of an artist's copyright in his or her work.58
The notion of an author possessing some form of quasi-mystical right to
his writings is alien to the American intellectual property regime.
Unsurprisingly, American courts have almost universally ignored these rights
when they consider copyright claims.5 9 The statutory basis for American
copyright law comes directly from the United States Constitution. 60 The
Constitution is explicit in its goal: "to promote the Progress of Science and
Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors... the exclusive Right
to their ... Writings . "..."61
In order to promote science and the useful arts,

52. Justin Hughes, American Moral Rights and Fixing the Dastar "Gap," 2007 UTAH L. REV. 659,
662 (2007).
53. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.01 (Matthew
Bender & Co., Inc. 2009) (1978).
54. Carter v. Helnsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cit. 1995).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Laurence R. Helfer, 1-uman Rights and Intellectual Property: Confct or Coexistence?, 5 MINN.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 47, 48 (2003).

58. Carter,71 F.3d at 81.
59. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Rigbt. Is an Ameican Marriage Possible?, 38
VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 (1985).
60. Michael H. Davis, Extending Copyrgbt and the Constitulion: '-lave I Staed Too Long?" 52 FLA.
L. REV. 989, 994 (2000).
61.

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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the provision grants authors a temporary monopoly over their creation.
Often referred to as the "Copyright Clause," this constitutional provision
gives Congress the authority to enact a broad range of federal statutes
designed to offer authors and artists incentive to create and protect their
62
financial interests in their creations.
The underlying motivation behind granting exclusive rights is a frequent
subject of academic debate. Some scholars argue that it is possible to interpret
63
the Constitutional Copyright Clause as not completely rejecting natural law.
They assert that this interpretation is supported by both legislative history and
policy-making interpretation. 64 European intellectual property regimes tend
to justify copyright, trademark, and patent law rights as protecting the creative
laborer and the product of his toil.65 Such a conception is consonant with a
Lockean focus on the individual aspects of creative endeavor. 66 This "natural
law mystique that traditionally has surrounded copyright ...on the European
continent" means Europe is in a better position to offer stringent protection
to creators. 67 By the same token, this "personality-based understanding of
copyright law supports, and, in fact, requires, strong protection of those
aspects of the work that reflect the author's identity, whereas the [American]
68
regulatory [system] is reluctant to acknowledge these rights."
III. Analysis: Truth and Justice
A. The Appeal of Moral Rights
A purely economic justification for copyright focuses on the efficiency of
creating a marketplace for ideas to ascertain their cultural value. But the
coldly calculating, mercenary nature of this approach doesn't fully appreciate
the cultural benefits of artistic endeavors. 69 Intellectual property may be
analogous to real property in many ways, but the act of creation is vastly

62. MARGETH BARRETT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 404 (3d ed.
2007).
63. Id.
at 500.
64. Id. at 506.
65. F. Willern Grosheide, Paradigmsin Copyright Law, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS
ON COPYRIGHT LAW 205, 207 (Brad Sherman & Alain Strowel eds., 1994).
66. Michael D. Birnhack, Copyrght Law and Free Speech After Eldred v. Ashcroft, 76 S. CAL. L
REV. 1275, 1293 (2003).
67. P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe, in EXPANDING THE
BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE
SOCIETY 343, 344 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Diane Leenheer Zimmerman & Harry First eds.,
2001).
68. Birnhaek, supra note 66, at 1294-95.
69. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creaive Employee and the CopyrightAct of 1976, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 590, 605 (1987).
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different and requires recognition of the personality of the author. 70 Purely
utilitarian protection does not make allowances for the personal risk of the
artist in allowing the public into their consciousness and creating art by
expressing their inner psyches, a process qualitatively different from more
mundane types of production. 71 Every society tends to revere its storytellers
and artists. The moral rights approach carries a certain populist appeal, but
what does it mean?
Moral rights in the context of copyrights can be a broad category. It is a
catchall term that applies to a bundle of relationships and controls that stem
from the labor involved in the creative work.7 2 The moral rights theory is
based on a natural law conception of an author having a moral connection to
his or her work over and beyond the economic incentive, which is inalienable
from the author. 73 The copyright statutes currently in force in France,
Germany, and Italy all contain provisions that are expressly designed to
protect the rights of disclosure, attribution, integrity, and withdrawal. 74 While
the American Copyright Act does not expressly authorize the protection of
these rights, there are indirect methods for doing so, although attempts to
address moral rights often do more harm than good. 75 Trying to create a
broader base for American copyright has actually resulted in decreased
protection for the majority of authors. 76 There remains an hospitable middle
ground in which moral rights are recognized, while artists and the media
companies that make their work widely available are still free to work
together. This approach would allow copyright protection to continue to
77
serve as a creative spur, with moral rights serving to augment this function.
B. Termination of Renewal
In 1976, Congress ended the confusion caused by the old copyright
termination system by reviving an author's ownership interest in their
creations at the end of the original statutory period regardless of "any
agreement to the contrary." 78 This work-around was intended to give authors

70. Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Authors' Rghts-Based Copyright Law: The Fairnessand Morality of French
andAmeican Law Compared, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 549, 564 (2006).
71. Susan P. Liemer, UnderstandingArtists'MoralRights:A Primer,7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 41, 43-44
(1998).
72. Cyril P. Rigamonti, DeconstruclingMoral Rights, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 353,359 (2006).
73. Id.
at 359-62.
74. Id, at 359.
at 412.
75. Id.
76. Id.
at 399-400.
77. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973).
78. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(4)(A)(5).
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greater bargaining power at the end of an initial assignment. 79 This was
largely because the consequences suffered from an "ill-advised and
unprofitable granto that had been made before the author had a fair
opportunity to appreciate the true value of his work product" could be
harsh.80 Siegel and Shuster's compensation, even that received for the more
generous grants of renewal rights, was never truly equitable when compared
to the total revenue generated by the "Man of Steel." The most important
time for addressing this disparity was at the time of renewal because this
allowed all parties to approach the arrangement with a more realistic idea of
the value inherent in the character. 81
This crucial opportunity was not available to Siegel and Shuster because
the termination provision in the agreement, designed to prevent the
consequences of poor contracting on their part, failed to accomplish its
purpose. Although the termination provision was designed to tip the balance
of power ever so slightly in the direction of creators, the shift was not
automatic.8 2 Mindful of this failure, Judge Larson, of the Central District of
California, who granted summary judgment to Siegel's heirs, thus awarding
them Siegel's half of the copyright in Superman, gave unusual attention to the
details of the story of the secret origin behind the creation of Superman.8 3
His opinion betrays an understandable fascination with the generative process.
There are hints that he found the plight of Siegel and Shuster to be
compelling on a personal level, demonstrated by his frequent references to
the pair's process of giving "life and color" to the idea of the character.8 4
Although Judge Larson seemed impressed with the romantic nature of the real
life origin of Superman, he limited himself to an examination of two
foundational issues that establish the scope of the termination provision:
whether the termination notices were valid and, if valid, the reach of the rights
85
that were recaptured.
At the time of the initial grant in 1938, the issue of whether Siegel and
Shuster could assign the renewal term rights during the initial term was
unresolved.8 6 In 1943, the Supreme Court held, in FredFisher Music Co. v. M.
Witmark & Sons, that when an initial assignment was for all rights pertaining
79. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 124 available at http://homepages.uc.edu/
-armstrty/H_R_Rep_No_94-1476.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
80. Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
81. Harry Fox Agency, Inc. v. Mills Music, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 844, 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
82. Chandra, supra note 47, at 270.
83. See Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1102-16 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
84. Id. at 1104.
85. Id. at 1116.
86. Siegel v. Nat'l Periodical Publ'ns, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 1032, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (holding
that the plaintiffs were precluded from relitigating matters which could have been raised in the 1947
action and that therefore the right of renewal belonged to DC).
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to a work, it would include the renewal period and all renewal rights were lost
for the author. 87 Thus, in 1966, when the renewal rights to Superman should
have been subject to renegotiation, the creators of Superman were not able to
bargain for a more amenable arrangement that reflected the true market value
of the property due to the prior assignment of all rights to DC. This
underscores the disparate position of the bargaining parties in the creative
marketplace. 88 At the time of the initial publication, no one could have
accurately predicted the popularity of the character. 89 In some ways, Action
Comics, Vol. 1 was published as a "pure accident," 90 and neither the creators of
Superman nor any of the editorial staff had any real way of knowing the
resonance the character would achieve and the hold it would take on the
popular imagination.
Despite the cutthroat nature of the business, comic books are an art form
and the works of writers and artists are "original works of authorship" fixed in
a tangible medium of expression and are as worthy of copyright protection as
any other media. 91 Comic books do provide a unique form of expression
because they occupy a hybrid place between "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works" 92 and "literary works." 93 Although comic book stories are pictorial,
they are typically drawn from scripts that an author writes and exist as pure
objects of collaboration. 94 They operate much like musical compositions in
that the script and art are "inseparable or interdependent parts."95 The
collaborative nature of the comic book creation process makes apportioning
ownership interests problematic, even before publishers like DC enter the
equation.96 The publisher takes all the financial risks by investing in a physical
print run of the work, while the true value of the character may be
independent of the particular comic in which he appears. 97 The nascent
comic book industry was heavily skewed toward the powerful publishers,
leaving creators like Siegel and Shuster without any meaningful bargaining
power. 98 If the idea was for the creators to sign their rights away, as part of

87. Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 657 (1943).
88. Allison M. Scott, Oh, Bother: Milne, Steinbeck, and an Emeging Circuit Split over the Alienabiliy of
Copyright Termination Rights, 14J. INTELL. PROP. L. 357, 363 (2007).
89. JONES, supra note 3, at 141.
90.

DANIELS, supra note 17, at 35.

91. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
92. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5).
93. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1).
94. See DANIELS, supra note 17, at 15, 18.
95. Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
96. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 658-59 (7th Cit. 2004).
97. See David B. Feldman, Finding a Homefor FictionalCharacters:A ProposalforChange in Copyight
Protection, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 687, 704 (1990).
98. SeeJONES, supra note 3, at 125.
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standard operating procedure, and accept a page by page rate, renegotiating
compensation when the value of the property was clearer, then the Fred Fisher
case was disastrous for creators like Siegel and Shuster. 99
The ambiguity in the 1976 Copyright Act requirements calls for a certain
fastidiousness in examining the finer points of Siegel and Shuster's creative
timeline. 10 0 Under the Act, the assignment of rights to works created and
assigned prior to 1978 can be terminated any time within the five-year window
beginning "exactly 56 years from the date copyright was originally secured."' 01
For example, if a copyright was secured on April 18, 1938, the five-year
termination window opened on April 18, 1994.102 But even if the heirs miss
this initial window, a second five-year window opens 75 years after the date
the initial copyright was secured, as long as the work was in its renewal term
in 1998.103 An exception to this exists for works for hire, because they fall
outside of the scope of the termination provisions. 10 4 Not coincidentally, the
vast majority of modern comic books are published on a work-for-hire basis
and the current state of the industry is heavily skewed toward large corporate
5
rights holders like DC and Marvel comics. 10

Judge Larson's decision zeroes in on the threshold issue of the effective
date of the Siegel's termination. 106 The Siegel's counsel created a date of
termination that occurred before the publication of Aclion Comics, Vol. 1, but
after DC had already published several advertisements for the upcoming
book. 07 Since the advertisements were printed in DC's copyrighted books, it
retained ownership in the elements of the character present in those
advertisements. 10 8 Judge Larson was somewhat glib in his assessment of the
limits of the right to exploit those elements, stating specifically that
"defendants may continue to exploit the image of a person with extraordinary
strength who wears a black and white leotard and cape."' 10 9 Even though he
was careful to delineate the relatively useless extent of its implications, Judge
Larson nevertheless refused to blur the line or stray from the formal

99. Chandra, supra note 47, at 256.
100. Siegel, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1117.
101. John M. Conley and Nichelle N. Levy, Time Warner Loses Superman Copyright to Creator's
Family, ROBINSON, BRADSHAW, AND HINTON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ARTICLE, June 2008,
http://www.rbh.com/pdf/articl jconley-imewarner.pdf, at 2.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 291 (2d Cit. 2002).
105. DOUGLAS WOLK, READING COMICS: How GRAPHIC NOVELS WORK AND WHAT THEY
MEAN 27 (2007).
106. Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm't Co., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1119 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
107. Id. at 1118.
108. Id. at 1126.
109. Id.
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requirements of termination. 1° The Siegels were only able to terminate the
assignment of the elements of the Superman character that surfaced in Action
They could not recapture ownership of subsequent
Comics, Vol. 1.111
developments of the series, like the name of Superman's home planet of
Krypton and the characters of Lex Luthor and Superman's pal Jimmy
Olsen." 2 This created a bright line temporal distinction between elements of
the character published by DC before and after the effectiveness window, and
therefore outside the reach of the Siegel heirs. 113 In addition to the
advertising material, the publisher also retained an interest in several aspects
of the character that were not present in his first appearance since they
operate as derivative works. 1 4 Characters and storytelling devices that would
later become integral to the Superman milieu did not appear in the first
issue. 115 Notable absences include such villainous mainstays as Lex Luthor,
Brainiac, and General Zod, as well as supporting characters like Jimmy Olsen
1 16
and Perry White, not to mention Kryptonite or the Planet Krypton itself.
Also, the original level of Superman's abilities was far below what they would
eventually become since he could not fly, was less than invulnerable, and the
particulars of his origin remained largely unexplained.' 11 All these aspects of
the character came later, a natural result of the extended serialized storytelling
of comic books that have published continuously for eight decades. 1 8 These
later embellishments take the form of derivative works. 119 The recapture of
only some interests in the Superman character by Siegel's heirs created a new
issue of how those elements owned by the heirs and those owned by DC will
interact. Another unresolved issue is to what extent the copyright interest
recaptured by the Siegel heirs applies to the modern Superman character.
DC took the position that even if the termination notice was within the
requisite timeframe, the copyrightable material contained in Action Comics, Vol.
1, are unaffected by the termination notice because those portions belong
exclusively to them as "works for hire."' 120 Since creative expressions that fall
under a work-for-hire arrangement are exempt from the termination
provisions of the 1976 Copyright Act, DC argued that "certain material found

110. Seeid.
111. Id. at 1145.
112. Seeid. at 1145, 1111.
113. Id.
at 1121.
114. Id. at 1142-43.
115. A Siegel Superman copyright decision FAQ, http://uncivilsociety.org/2008/03/a-siegelsuperman-copyright-de.html (March 29, 2008, 01:03).
116. Id.
117.

SeeDANIELS, supranote 17, 18-19.

118.
119.
120.

Chandra, supra note 47, at 270.
Siegel, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1129.
Id. at 1127.
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in the comic book was created by Detective Comics' in-house employees, or
that the material was added to the underlying Superman material by Siegel and
Shuster at the publisher's direction." 121 DC's contention was based on the
fact that it requested that the comic strip be reformatted to a comic book. It
argued that the change required additional materials that fundamentally
transformed the work Siegel and Shuster created and, thus, that the changes
were within the scope of the work-for-hire exception. 122 Judge Larson
eschewed the work-for-hire argument and agreed with the Second Circuit's
observation that "Superman and his miraculous powers were completely
developed long before the employment relationship was instituted." 23 This
analysis turned on the notion that Siegel and Shuster's recalibration of the
story, undertaken on DC's orders, was not sufficiently transformative of the
underlying creative material.124 Therefore, the changes did not overcome the
assertion that portions undertaken as a work for hire were derivative works of
the copyrightable material that the pair had already created. 125 As such, Judge
Larson clearly asserted that "the underlying work remain[s] the property of
126
the creators."
Under this analysis, the Siegel heirs could successfully terminate the
original grant of ownership of Superman, including all elements of the
character that appeared in Action Comics, Vol. 1. The decision was not an
unqualified success for the Siegels. Even if its exact parameters remain
undefined, the decision grants the Siegel heirs a tangible right to some longstanding elements of the Superman mythos including "Superman's name, his
alter ego, his compatriots, his origins, his mission to serve as a champion of
the oppressed, [and] his heroic abilities in general," and, more particularly:
the entire storyline from Action Comics, Vol. 1, Superman's distinctive
blue leotard (complete with its inverted triangular crest across the
chest with a red "S" on a yellow background), a red cape and boots,
and his superhuman ability to leap tall buildings, repel bullets, and run
127
faster than a locomotive.

121.

Id.
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Id.

123.
1974)).

Id. (quoting Siegel v. National Periodical Publications, Inc., 508 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir.
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at 1129.
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While not expressly based on Siegel's moral right, the decision nevertheless
provides an important step in that direction and supplies a useful dimension
to the debate over moral rights' place in American copyright law.
While the Siegel decision is far from the death knell of the economic
conception of ownership rights, it does represent a heretofore unprecedented
willingness to factor natural moral rights concerns into the equation. A purely
economic analysis of the case would have focused solely upon the contractual
obligations created by the parties as they negotiated for ownership of the
property.
Jerry Siegel provides a compelling example of the anger and bitterness
that results when a creator is divorced from his creation. A quote from his
obituary highlights his ever-increasing sense of alienation: "I can't stand to
look at a Superman comic book. It makes me physically ill. I love Superman,
and yet to me he has become an alien thing."' 128 The pathos of an old man
long denied access to his creation has become the constantly recurring theme
of Jerry Siegel's story. 129 One victory in the long struggle involved the
recognition of Siegel's role in Superman's creation. This moral right of
attribution is typically hard to establish with works for hire, making Siegel's
recognition unusual.' 30 Siegel, as part of the 1974 deal with DC, won this
right long after Shuster chose to stop litigating the matter.1 31 This was clearly
of overwhelming importance to Siegel since he was willing to delay a deal that
would have provided remuneration at a time when he was in serious financial
trouble. 132 Siegel insisted that every Superman product must clearly state
"Superman Created by Jerry Siegel and Joe Shuster."' 133 This recognition of
the inventors of the "Man of Steel" coincides neatly with the moral right of
paternity, and Siegel's advocates knowingly referenced the European
34

standard. 1

To be sure, Judge Larson's opinion considers the economic implications
of the bargaining process and the limitations on the rights recaptured by the
termination process.' 35 But the tone of the decision betrays his admiration
for the writer and a tangible amount of sympathy for his plight, especially in
the conclusory paragraph: "After seventy years, Jerome Siegel's heirs regain

Superman's Creator,Dies at 81, N.Y. TIMES, January 31,
Siegel,
128. Robert McG. Thomas, Jr., Jerry
1996, at B6.
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what he granted so long ago-the copyright in the Superman material that
was published in Action Comics, Vol. l."136

IV. Proposal: The American Way?
Judge Larson delivered an elegant solution to a long-standing problem.
His order for summary judgment, granting the Siegel heirs an ownership
interest in Superman, was an important step toward including moral rights of
authors to their work into the calculus of intellectual property. He did so by
slavishly parsing a complicated thicket of formal requirements, making this
decision a victory for proponents of a more balanced regime.
Read side by side with the results of a factually similar case, the Siegel
decision signifies a judicial soft spot for creators who traded away the rights to
characters who would later prove to be valuable. Like Superman, the
character of Captain America has pitted creator against publisher in a battle
over ownership. 137 With facts that closely resemble Siegel, the Second Circuit
ruled that Captain America creator Joseph Simon successfully terminated a
settlement agreement from 1969, in which he stated that he was operating in a
work for hire capacity when he created the character for Marvel Comics.

138

That case had several parallels with the Siegel litigation. Both authors had
created enduring comic book characters and assigned the rights to the
publishers. Simon, like Siegel, became dissatisfied with the state of affairs and
took to the courts in the 1960s when the first twenty-eight-year copyright
term approached its end. 139 He claimed that he owned the copyright in the
Captain America character. 140 Marvel's argument, prefiguring DC's later
claim, was that Simon conceived Captain America as work for hire and,
therefore, held no claim to the copyright.' 4' The parties settled the matter on
the conditions that Simon acknowledge that the works had been done for-hire
and assign any existing rights to Marvel Comics. 42 Simon then attempted to

file a termination of transfer, premised on the claim that the settlement
agreement was an "agreement to the contrary," which is expressly
contemplated in the Copyright Act.143 Simon convinced the court that "any
other construction of [the termination of transfer provision] would thwart the

136.

Id.at 1145.

137. Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 2002).
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at 292.
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clear legislative purpose and intent of the statute."' 144 Simon was then free to
raise claims of authorship in the termination action.145
In a case between a creator and a giant corporate publisher, the popular
sense of justice should influence the court to consider the importance of
authorship in determining ownership interest. There is something morally
compelling about authors fighting for the fruits of their labors.146 Both Simon
and Siegel address the scope of the termination right granted by the 1976
Copyright Act, and both cases affirm the moral rights of comic book creators
in their characters. The termination right does not apply to work-for-hire
material, but the implications of such a construction are tantalizing. In a
world where films licensed from comic books routinely top the movie charts,
the copyright interest in four-color creations is increasing in value every
summer, when blockbuster superhero films typically enter wide release. The
Simon and Siegel cases, taken together, evince that the circuit courts are taking
an increasingly expansive view of creators' rights. This could have potentially
far-reaching effects. Currently, the major comic book companies employ
writers and artists largely on a work-for-hire basis, although there are less
restrictive contracts that allow creators to retain ownership of their
characters. 147 The economics of the comic book publishing industry means
that the largest publishers require creators to operate almost exclusively under
work-for-hire contracts because the publishers take most of the financial risk
in producing a book. 148 However, the court in Simon was willing to discard
even an explicit agreement to work for hire. 149 In Siegel, the court applied an
extremely narrow reading of the previous agreements between the parties,
leaving room for the authors to later recapture their rights to work created
before their working relationship with the publisher began. 50
In the
aggregate, this may signal an increase in judicial recognition of moral rights.
Critics of the Siegel decision may feel dissatisfaction with the degree to
which it constrains the ability of publishers to efficiently exploit the property
that they paid for as works for hire. Movie studios and other purveyors of
144. Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 290 (2d Cir. 2002).
145. Emerson, supra note 139, at 222.
146. This is evidenced by the fact that the drama surrounding Siegel and Shuster has been the
subject of not only historical accounts, like MEN OF TOMORROW JONES, supra note 3), but has
proved fertile ground for fictional explanation.
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147.
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for hire versus creator ownership.
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media tend to protect their own interests, and may become hesitant to publish
characters created by litigious creators.151 On a purely economic level, there
may be an overall deleterious effect on the breadth of works being published,
as publishers become hesitant about publishing new works because they fear
that case law and the Copyright Act will undermine their ability to assert
control over the property indefinitely, even if they contract for such control.
Nevertheless, the high value of comic book characters will keep publishers
from becoming too deterred.
The Siegel decision may have vindicated Jerry Siegel's rights as a creator,
but the exact nature of what his heirs secured for themselves remains unclear.
Due to the unique nature of serial storytelling, the character has changed a
great deal from his initial 1938 appearance in Acion Comics, Vol. 1, to the
contemporary manifestation. The degree to which the Siegels can exert
influence over the modern character remains unclear. 5 2 While they "own"
half the character, it seems unlikely that they could exert any meaningful
editorial control over him or access overseas profits (which would
undoubtedly be phenomenal for an internationally known property like
Superman). 153 Even apportioning the profits from the spate of movies,
comics, television shows, and other media since 1999 will prove to be a
monumental and contentious undertaking.
Furthermore, this decision is only part of ongoing litigation and,
therefore, the role it will ultimately play remains to be seen. Settlement is still
a likely resolution and, if past transactions are any indication, there could be
serious concessions by the Siegel heirs to their ownership rights.
Nevertheless, Siegel's heirs carved out a victory. Subsequent decisions in this
case will deal with movie licenses and the fair market value of what Siegel
54
sold, thus clarifying the value of what the heirs recaptured. 1
There are also a number of issues whose significance is not yet clear.
There is a parallel proceeding with regard to the character of Superboy, the
youthful incarnation of the character that proceeds apace.' 55 The role of the
Shuster heirs is equally uncertain. The Superman trademark is another
potential area of contention and will have a huge impact on the eventual
outcome. 5 6 The literary value of Superman is one thing, but the distinctive

151. See generally Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, (7th Cir. 2004) (providing an example of a
particularly contentious creator-publisher relationship).
152. Siegel, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1142.
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154. Siegel, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1145.
155. See Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78193 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12,
2009).
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visual elements of the character go a great distance towards creating the
character's high value. 157 Doctrinally distinct, the trademark issues will require
an entirely different consideration.
V. Conclusion
The battle over the rights to Superman has raged for the better part of a
century. It has spanned generations. It is fitting that such an iconic character
serves as the locus around which competing copyright protection interests
have clashed because it provided a colorful framework for the serious debate
over the issue. DC takes the role of a Lex Luthor-ian stand-in for the
stereotypical corporate rights holder, who might desire world domination but
is willing to settle for tighter intellectual property protection. Siegel embodies
the qualities of tenacity and confidence in individual creative vision that inhere
in romantic conceptions of authorship. The unfairness of the dealings
between the two parties is as salient a demonstration of the unequal
bargaining power between large corporations and individual authors as there
could be. The litigation boils down to a level of iconic abstraction worthy of
its own comic book.
The Siegel decision granting summary judgment and awarding a significant
portion of the copyright interest in the Superman character to the heirs of its
creator is not a complete validation of moral rights, nor is it a purely utilitarian
rejection of them. Rather, the decision demonstrates the courts' willingness to
consider some elements of the moral rights conception, even as they grapple
with the implications of the uneasy fit within the larger American copyright
arena. This decision necessarily focused on a number of factually specific
intricacies, but the case still provides a handy rubric for considering the appeal
of moral rights and demonstrates the subtlety of their influence.
In
vindicating the Siegel heirs' right to terminate their renewal notice, despite
clear and convincing language to the contrary, this case underscores the
intuitive appeal of acknowledging the social appreciation for personal genius
and the mystique of the creator.
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